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19591 CASE COMMENTS
majority gave no reason for dropping its lack of jurisdiction argu-
ment, the dissent suggests that the reason stemmed from public policy
arguments concerning the stability of titles. It appears that the court
did realize the consequences of including this argument in its opinion.
Therefore, it would seem that the court ultimately heeded the words
of Justice Holmes and proceeded slowly in expressing views affecting
such a basic concept as jurisdiction over the subject matter.
NxcHoLAs W. BATH
SURVIVING TENANT'S RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
FOR ENTIRETIES DEBT
Seldom does a legally sound result assume a more unjust appear-
ance than in the situation which occurs when two spouses jointly incur
an indebtedness secured by a mortgage on property held as tenancy
by entireties, and where one spouse dies, following which the surviv-
ing spouse, now owner in fee,' asserts a claim against the deceased
spouse's estate for contribution of one-half of the mortgage debt. At
first glance, it seems inequitable to allow one who has become by sur-
vivorship the owner in fee of encumbered land to avoid the full obli-
gation which the land secures.
The Supreme Court of Delaware was confronted with this problem
in the recent case of In re Estate of Keil.2 In this case a husband and
wife acquired title to a tract of land as tenants by the entirety. A year
later the husband executed his will, in which he directed his executors
to pay all his "just debts and funeral expenses ' 3 out of the estate. The
testator bequeathed money to his wife, certain relatives, and certain
charitable institutions, one of which was to receive the residue of the
estate. The legacy to his wife was to be paid first, then the legacies to
his relatives, and then a legacy to one of the institutions. Some months
after the execution of the will, the spouses borrowed $8,ooo for the
purpose of making improvements upon the entireties property. The
debt was evidenced by a joint and several bond, and was secured by
a mortgage on the entireties property. Soon afterward, before any of
the debt was paid, the husband died, and proceedings were instituted
"The most important incident of tenancy by entireties is that the survivor of
the marriage, whether the husband or the wife, is entitled to the whole...." 2 Tif-
fany, Real Property § 430 (3 d ed. 1939).
2145 A.2d 563 (Del. 1958).
Oid. at 564.
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for the purpose of distributing the assets of his estate. Instructions
were sought upon the question of the extent to which the decedent's
estate would be ultimately liable for the $8,ooo debt; for if it would
be liable at all, the funds remaining would be insufficient to pay all of
the legacies to the institutions, and the residuary legatee would be paid
nothing. The wife contended that she was entitled to contribution
of one-half of the debt 4 because she would be forced to pay, when
the debt fell due,5 the whole of a joint and several obligation, and
consequently she should be reimbursed for an expenditure that would
erase the obligation of her co-debtor. The trial court, which had denied
contribution, was reversed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in a
two-to-one decision.
Thus Delaware joined Indiana, 6 Maryland,7 North Carolina,8 New
Jersey,9 Pennsylvania, 10 Tennessee," and Virginia 12 in enforcing a
deceased spouse's joint and several obligation against his estate, even
when all benefits of and title to the land securing the debt pass to his
spouse by survivorship.13 Jurisdictions which deny contribution are
"She initially contended that she should be excused from any payment on the
grounds that (i) the will expressly provided that all just debts were payable out of
the estate; (2) the debt did not exist at the time of the will's execution, and there-
fore he intended for her to have the land unencumbered; and (3) she only received
$35,000 out of a $122,ooo estate, and that consequently he could not have intended
this proportionately small sum to be diminished by payment of outstanding debts.
The court found, however, that the "just debts" clause was a standard provision
and merely declaratory of the law, and that no language in the will supported the
wife's other contentions. 145 A.2d at 564.
5Technically, the right to contribution cannot be asserted until one has ac-
tually paid funds, and thus changed his position by extinguishing or diminishing
the obligation of his co-debtor. 13 Am. Jur. Contribution § 7 (1938). But it is well
settled that no legacies should be paid out of the estate until the decedent's debts
are first met. 2 Glenn, Mortgages § 304.1 (1943). The parties to the Keil case agreed
that if the wife had a right to contribution, that right was to be asserted imme-
diately. 145 A.2d at 566.
OMagenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919)-
7Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930)-
sMontsinger v. White, 240 N.C. 441, 82 S.E.2d 362 (1954); Underwood v. Ward,
239 N.C. 513, 8o S.E.2d 267 (1954); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C.
219, 151 S.E. 269 (1930).
9Nobile v. Bartletta, iog N.J. Eq. 119, 156 Atl. 483 (1931).
10In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951); In re Kershaw's Estate,
352 Pa. 205, 42 A.2d 538 (1945). In the Kershaw case, one-half of the amount of a
debt secured by a mortgage on entireties property which passed to the survivor was
held deductible as a debt of the estate for tax purposes.
nNewson v. Shackelford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931).
'2Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957).
"If the land passes by will or intestacy, quite another situation is created. At
common law and in many jurisdictions today, the law "favors the heir," in that an
heir or devisee of a mortgaged tract takes free of the encumbrance, absent an ex-
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New York,14 Florida,' 5 and Massachusetts. 16 It is submitted that the
Delaware view is the sound one.
When a husband and wife execute a joint and several note, each
becomes liable for the entire amount,' 7 but if one is forced to pay
more than his or her proportionate share, then he or she is entitled
to contribution from the other.' s The death of one of the parties does
not disturb this relationship, and the party entitled to contribution
may assert his right against the estate of the deceased co-debtor.' 9
Why should this deep-rooted principle be deemed inapplicable merely
because of the nature of the collateral securing the debt?
The dissenting judge in the Keil case favored the denial of contri-
bution, using the following reasoning: contribution is a right which
sounds in equity and is based on equitable principles of natural jus-
tice.2 0 To allow the survivor to acquire title to the land without dis-
charging the entire debt is to bestow upon her the full value of the
land in addition to the value of one-half of the debt, thereby unjustly
increasing her equity by the amount of one-half of the debt.2 1 By such
a result "the widow would receive a windfall or unjust enrichment, to
which she would not be equitably entitled. '22
pressed intention to the contrary, and the estate alone is liable. 2 Glenn, Mortgages
§ 3o2 (1943). The heir or devisee was never liable on the debt, whereas in the instant
case the survivor was initially jointly and severally liable.
1'Geldart v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 2o9 App. Div. 581, 2o5 N.Y. Supp.
238 (2d Dep't 1924); Robinson v. Bogert, 187 Misc. 735, 64 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct.
1946); In re Dell's Estate, 154 Misc. 216, 276 N.Y. Supp 96o (Surr. Ct. 1935).
"Lopez v. Lopez, go So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
16Ratte v. Ratte, 26o Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927).
'72 Williston, Contracts § 320 (rev. ed. 1936).
"In re Estate of Keil, 145 A.2d 563, 565 (Del. 1958) (dictum); 2 Williston, Con-
tracts § 345 (rev. ed. 1936). The right of a cotenant, who discharges an encumbrance
upon the common property, to rateable contribution from his cotenants has been
said to arise from the trust relationship which exists among co-owners of property.
"But whatever may have been its origin, the doctrine is firmly established by the
authorities...." Grove v. Grove, 1oo Va. 556, 42 S.E. 312, 314 (19o2).
I2 Williston, Contracts § 345 (rev. ed. 1936).
nThis statement implies that contribution is not based on contract. This is
correct, but if a contract exists, it may determine the existence and amount of
contribution. 2 Williston, Contracts § 345 (rev. ed. 1936).
"The dissenting judge in Keil states it thusly: "Prior to the death of her hus-
band each cotenant... owned the property in question subject to a mortgage of
$8,ooo. Assuming that the property was worth $2o,ooo, there was an equity of $12,ooo.
If the widow now should pay off the full amount of the mortgage, as I think she
should, the amount of the equity would remain unchanged. However, if she should
be permitted to compel the estate of her deceased husband to pay off one-half the
amount due under the mortgage, or $4,ooo, she would then own the property sub-
ject only to a lien of $4,ooo, giving her an equity of $16,ooo instead of $12,00o." 145
A.2d at 567-68. See 13 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 763, 765 (1952).
--'145 A.2d at 567. "[tjhe doctrine of contribution rests on principles of equity
19591
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What the dissent in fact does is to impose the incidents of the es-
tate upon which the security is held on the money obligation itself.
Such an approach judicially creates a debt by the entirety, with the in-
cident of survivorship, when survivorship was not expressed or im-
plied in either the debt contract or the mortgage deed.23 The law
recognizes a presumption that when a decedent was bound on an obli-
gation while living, his personal representative is likewise liable at
his death.24 Even though this presumption remained unrebutted in
the principal case, the dissent would relieve the estate from payment
of any part of the debt. This result can be reached only by invoking
vague notions of "natural justice" which fly in the face of a valid, en-
forceable contract obligation.
The better view, as asserted in the Keil case, is that "the right of
contribution flows from the debt, not from the mortgage lien. The
incidental existence of collateral in the hands of the creditor is...
immaterial in enforcing this right."2 The court correctly refused to
allow the incidents of the collateral to eclipse the true nature of the
transaction. "This is the ordinary case of a joint debt, contracted by
both parties for their common benefit... -"26 with the result that "the
estate of the deceased debtor is liable to contribute one-half of the
debt."
27
The dissent, however, reasons that it is unjust to bestow upon
the survivor both the fee and the benefit of being relieved of one-half
of the money obligation. But it acknowledges the fact that the right
to contribution "is a matter resting entirely between the joint debt-
ors." 28 If, then, the relationship between the joint debtors controls,
why should the deceased spouse's money obligation be released, when
and natural justice and will not be applied where these are lacking or where...
inequity and injustice result." In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209, 212
(1951) (dissenting opinion).
3This erroneous extension of the doctrine of survivorship, necessarily employed
by the dissenting judge in Keil, is also proposed by the dissenting judge in In re
Dowler's Estate, who asks the following question: "Is it not logical and just that
a joint obligation of a husband and wife arising directly out of the entireties prop-
erty should be considered as between husband and wife to be an entireties obliga-
tion?" 84 A.2d at 212. But does the joint obligation arise directly out of the col-
lateral?
2In re Traub's Estate, 354 Mich. 263, 92 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1958); Chamberlain v.
Dunlop, 126 N.Y. 45, 26 N.E. 966, 967 (1891); Kernochan v. Murray, iii N.Y. 3o6, iS
N.E. 868, 869-70 (1888); Am. Chain Co. v. Arrow Grip Mfg. Co., 134 Misc. 321, 235
N.Y. Supp. 228, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
0145 A.2d at 565.
'Id. at 566.
=Ibid.
8145 A.2d at 567.
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such a release was not contemplated in the debt contract itself? If
the debt had been unsecured, the surviving spouse would have had
little difficulty in exacting contribution from the estate.29 A debt
should not be extinguished solely because it is secured by land to
which the surviving joint debtor acquires title by operation of law.
When the spouses acquired the land as tenants by entireties, they
voluntarily assented to the peculiar incident of survivorship. Each
had an equal chance of surviving the other and of acquiring the fee.
It was inevitable that one's chance of acquisition would be extin-
guished by death. By the original deed which created the tenancy by
entireties, the husband bought the enjoyment of the land for his
life, and the possibility of acquiring the fee. That this expectancy
did not occur does not absolve him from his debt. If the debt had been
paid by his wife during his life, she would clearly have been entitled
to contribution. 30 Why, then, should his death before she paid cancel
his debt?31
The dissent necessarily creates a new type of joint and several
money obligation-one which, without an expressed or implied inten-
don by the parties, compels payment by the survivor in the event that
he or she acquires title to the collateral by survivorship. This result
is reached ostensibly to prevent unjust enrichment. Instead, it works
unjust enrichment in that it releases a joint and several obligor from a
debt upon which he has paid nothing. Any "unjust enrichment" to the
survivor stems from the original entireties deed and not from his
right to contribution. What the dissent actually attacks, then, is the
notion of survivorship.32 It is shocking to the dissenting judge that
the survivor should acquire the land in fee without also assuming
aId. at 565; 2 Williston, Contracts § 345 (rev. ed. 1936).
"113 C.J. Contribution § 13 (1917).
3'A comparable situation which is governed by the same principles, and which
varies only in degree, occurs when the survivor-to-be pays before the death of his or
her spouse, and then upon the death the estate seeks to avoid liability.
1"It may be that, because of modern innovations on the common law respecting
the property rights of married women, the venerable estate known as estate by
entireties has outlived the purpose of its creation and is out of harmony with present
conditions. However this may be, if change is desired, it must come through legis-
lative action, and not through judicial construction. This estate is too well established
and too well defined to be subject to judicial impairment." Biehl v. Martin, 236
Pa. 519, 84 Ati. 953, 954 (1912).
An excellent survey of legislative impact on estates by entireties is found in Dean
Oval A. Phipps' discussion of the subject in 25 Temp. L.Q. 24 (1951).
Creditors of one spouse have the best reason to be critical of the estate, as en-
cumbrances on property held by the entirety will not operate to deprive a cotenant
of his right to possession or of his contingent right of survivorship. 2 American Law
of Property § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
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